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A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that social and cooperative behavior can be af-
fected by cognitive and neurological factors, suggesting the existence of state-based decision-making
mechanisms that may have emerged by evolution. Motivated by these observations, we propose a
simple mechanism of anonymous network interactions identified as a form of generalized reciprocity
– a concept organized around the premise “help anyone if helped by someone”, and study its dynam-
ics on random graphs. In the presence of such mechanism, the evolution of cooperation is related to
the dynamics of the levels of investments (i.e. probabilities of cooperation) of the individual nodes
engaging in interactions. We demonstrate that the propensity for cooperation is determined by a
network centrality measure here referred to as neighborhood importance index and discuss relevant
implications to natural and artificial systems. To address the robustness of the state-based strategies
to an invasion of defectors, we additionally provide an analysis which redefines the results for the
case when a fraction of the nodes behave as unconditional defectors.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Ey, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation has played a fundamental role in many
of the major transitions in biological evolution and is
essential to the functioning of a large number of biological
systems [1]. Cooperative interactions are required for
many levels of network organization ranging from single
cells to groups of animals and, ultimately, humans.
While kin selection [2] and group (multilevel) selection
[3, 4] have been able to explain the emergence and stabil-
ity of cooperation in related individuals, the occurrence
of cooperation between unrelated individuals is more in-
triguing [5, 6]. Theoretical models provide evidence that
cooperative behavior can nevertheless evolve and persist
if it is based on reciprocity [7–9]. An important role in
the emergence of cooperation plays the network struc-
ture. Since the early work of Novak and May [10] which
demonstrated that a lattice structure enhances coopera-
tion in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, this issue has
attracted a great deal of attention, see for example [11–
18]. In particular, the consequences of population struc-
ture on the evolution of reciprocal cooperation were stud-
ied in [19–22]. It has also been recognized that underlying
network structures such as network heterogeneity, scale-
freeness etc., crucially determine the outcome of multiple
dynamical phenomena [23].
To what extent reciprocity can explain the behavior
of biological organisms is a subject of active debate (see
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e.g. [24, 25] for a recent review). According to [24], a ma-
jor concern is that the assumptions of theoretical models
differ in important ways from the observed structure of
real interactions, as supported by experimental evidence
[26–28]. As a result, the mechanisms proposed in some
of the theoretical models are unlikely to be realized by
evolution in real organisms [6]. Particularly, direct and
indirect reciprocity require cognitive abilities to register
identity of social partners and their behavior in previous
interactions, which has been shown to constrain cooper-
ation in animals [29], including humans [30].
Recent empirical studies have shown that cooperation
in animals (rats [31], monkeys [32], dogs [33]), as well
as humans [34, 35], can work between non-relative con-
specifics by generalized reciprocity - a simple mechanism
which does not require higher cognitive demands. This
mechanism, simply described as “help anyone if helped
by someone”, assumes that an individual who received
help in the past is more likely to help any new individ-
ual in subsequent interactions. Generalized reciprocity,
which can be traced back to “upstream tit-for-tat” [36]
and “upstream indirect reciprocity” [37]), has been re-
cently addressed in detail in [24, 25].
A growing body of recent empirical research indicates
that social and cooperative behavior can be affected by
cognitive and neurological factors, such as experience
and hormone titres [38]. In this context, it has been
suggested that the proximate mechanism of generalized
reciprocity is based on changes of the individuals phys-
iological/neurological state [31, 34, 39]. The first steps
in the direction of understanding the evolutionary pro-
cesses underlying generalized reciprocity have been made
in [36, 37]. In [40] the formation of a decision-making
mechanism based on an internal state has been inves-
2tigated by evolutionary simulation. There it has been
demonstrated that a mechanism where the individuals
base their decision to cooperate based on a state variable
updated by the outcome of the last interaction with an
anonymous partner, can emerge through small evolution-
ary steps under a wide range of conditions.
In the presence of supporting empirical evidence for
the evolutionary development of a state-based decision-
making mechanism, we propose a general framework to
address the dynamics of such mechanisms on complex
networks. We adopt a simple (stochastic) model for net-
work interactions, where nodes regularly send coopera-
tion requests to randomly chosen neighbors. The selected
nodes accept the requests (cooperate) with probability
determined by a single variable - an internal cooperative
state which reflects their current “well being”. The re-
sulting behavioral mechanism relates the nodes’ behavior
in the network interactions to their fitness, i.e. accumu-
lated payoff in a game-theoretic jargon, with immediate
implications to a large plethora of real-life networks.
From a game-theoretic perspective, the behavioral
mechanism we address may be framed in the continu-
ous Prisoner dilemma context [41] according to which
the level of investment (i.e. the probability of coopera-
tion) is adjusted to the accumulated experience. While
in our stochastic model interactions happen between two
individuals, the fact that the behavioral mechanism is
oblivious to the identity of donors and receivers effec-
tively provides a framework where the network nodes en-
gage in a game with their neighborhood. This, in a sense,
is conceptually similar to some versions of the N-player
iterated Prisoners Dilemma [42, 43].
We point out that in our model we do not consider
“competition” between strategies in the sense of [44].
Also, we do not assume evolutionary updates in the sense
of e.g. [37], or imitation of the neighbor’s strategy (e.g.
imitation dynamics) [45]. Instead, we presume that a
general form of state-based generalized reciprocity mech-
anism is in place in the complex network of interest (i.e.
has evolved as a result of evolution, as suggested by em-
pirical evidence), effectively resulting in a continuum of
investment strategies with levels of investment changing
according to the nodes individual states.
With this in mind, the aim of our approach is to evalu-
ate the implications of this behavioral mechanism on the
cooperation in the network and, importantly, to reveal
the role of network structure. In particular, we show that,
in the presence of the here addressed state-based behav-
ioral mechanism, the levels of individual investments may
evolve from very low to significant, eventually saturating
to a point which is solely determined by the network
topology. To address the robustness of the state-based
strategies to an invasion by defectors, we restate the re-
sults for the case when a fraction of the network nodes
behave as unconditional defectors.
An important aspect of our model is the fact that the
anonymity of the network interactions is not associated
with an increased vulnerability to exploitation (as it is
generally the case with generalized reciprocity [24, 25]. In
fact, we are able to show that the behavioral mechanism
promotes cooperation by “driving” the network towards
a steady state beyond which the individual nodes are
protected from exploitation by the rest of the network.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. In
Sec. II we define the stochastic model for network inter-
actions and describe the proposed behavioral mechanism
(update rule). In the same section we present the de-
terministic counterpart of the stochastic model, which is
analytically tractable and represents a valid approxima-
tion in the steady state regime. In Sec. III we analyze the
deterministic model and address the issue of cooperation
from the perspective of the network topology. We further
derive important properties of the model related to the
spread and stability of cooperation in the network. The
analytical findings are supported by numerical results.
We conclude the paper by discussing the implications of
the model and drawing parallels with other theoretical
models and real-life networks.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Network model
The network is modeled as a random graph A on a
finite set N of N nodes, with binary edge variables Aij ∈
{0, 1} between pairs of nodes i, j ∈ N (Aij = 1, i 6= j
indicating neighborhood relation). The interactions be-
tween the nodes are modeled as follows: in each round
t, node i sends a cooperation request to a randomly (on
uniform) chosen node from its neighborhood, for example
j ∈ Ni; upon selection, node j accepts the request (i.e.
cooperates) with probability pj(t), which may be consid-
ered as its internal cooperative state at time t; if node j
accepts the request, i.e. cooperates, it pays a cost c for
node i to receive a benefit b (we assume these quanti-
ties to be the constant over the network). The (random)
payoff of node i at round t is
yi(t) = bxj(t)− cxi(t)
∑
k∈Ni
ρk(t). (1)
In (1): the selected index from the neighborhood of i
is a random variable uniformly distributed on the set
Ni, j ∼ U(Ni); xl(t), l = 1, . . . , N , are Bernoulli ran-
dom variables, each with parameter pl(t) (the coopera-
tive state); ρh is a Bernoulli random variable with param-
eter 1/dh, where dh is the degree of node h, dh =
∑
l Ah,l;
the term
∑
h∈Ni
ρh(t) captures the (random) number of
nodes (neighbors of i) which send a cooperative request
to i during round t. We note that the model (1) may be
easily extended to weighted graphs by substituting the
uniform distribution with categorical.
3B. Behavioral mechanism (update rule)
For simplicity, we assume a synchronous behavioral up-
date, based on of the accumulated (i.e. total) payoff of
the node i by time t, Yi(t) = Yi(t−1)+yi(t), with Yi(0)
being the initial condition and yi(0) = 0. The coopera-
tive state of node i at time t+ 1 is defined as
pi(t+ 1) = f (Yi(t)) , (2)
where we assume that the function f : R→ [0 1] is mono-
tonic (nondecreasing). A plausible choice which reflects
real-world behavior is the sigmoid (logistic) function
f(ω) =
[
1 + e−κ(ω−ω0)
]−1
,
where the parameters κ and ω0 define the steepness, re-
spectively the midpoint of the function.
We note that it is straightforward to extend the model
to account for an asynchronous behavioral update, where
in each step t node i updates its probability of cooper-
ation with probability u. In that case, the cooperative
state of node i at time instant t+ 1 is defined as
pi(t+ 1) = p
1−λ
i (t) · f
λ (Yi(t)) .
The dynamics of the behavioral update, is then dictated
by the payoff accumulated by each node in the (random)
time period between two updates to and to + Ti
∆Yi(to, to + Ti)
.
= Yi(to + Ti)−Yi(to)
= b
to+Ti∑
τ=to+1
xj(τ) − cxi(to + 1)
to+Ti∑
τ=to+1
Ri(τ),
with the comment that the index j ∈ Ni is updated in
each step τ .
In the following we will only address the scenario with
synchronous update, with the remark that the conclu-
sions also apply to the asynchronous scenario.
C. Random graphs
The starting point for studying games on graphs are
the models used in evolutionary biology, where the evo-
lution of the population over time can be determined by
solving a coupled set of differential equations (the repli-
cator equations, see, e.g. [46]). Besides being determin-
istic (no stochasticity in the decisions), this framework
assumes infinite, well-mixed populations.
To account for stochastic game dynamics and fi-
nite populations, evolutionary graph theory provides a
mathematical tool for representing population structure:
nodes correspond to individuals and edges indicate in-
teractions [19]. Graphs can describe spatially structured
populations of bacteria, plants or animals, tissue archi-
tecture and differentiation in multi-cellular organisms, or
social networks. In this context, the well-mixed popula-
tion, which is a classical scenario for mathematical stud-
ies of evolution, is given by the complete graph.
In this setting, the structure of the underlying random
graph dictates the final result of many real world systems,
including cooperation. In general, real world networks
are characterized with three properties [47]: i) high clus-
tering - two nodes have a higher probability to share an
edge if they have similar neighborhoods, ii) small-world
- short, on average, distance (shortest path length) from
one node to another, and iii) scale-freeness - power law
degree probability density function (pdf).
Many models have been developed for generating ran-
dom graphs that have (some of) these properties. We
study the behavior of our model on the four models that
are most often implemented i) Random d-regular graph,
ii) Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph, iii) Watts-Strogatz
(WS) random graph, and iv) Barabasi-Albert random
scale-free network. In the following, we describe them.
• Random d-regular graph – the simplest random
graph that can be found in the literature. Formally de-
fined as a random graph A (N, d) in which all nodes have
the same degree d [48]. As such, it has a degree pdf (and
hence a z pdf) described with the Dirac delta function,
whereas clustering and shortest path length generally de-
pend on the parameter d. To generate a d-regular graph
we implement the pairing algorithm described in [49].
A special type of a regular graph that has been com-
monly studied in evolutionary biology is the two dimen-
sional (2D) N × N square lattice [10]. A such lattice is
characterized with low (zero) clustering and long average
path length. The main difference between a 2D square
lattice and other random regular graphs is that the struc-
ture of the former is not random. Namely, in it the nodes
are distributed at the integer coordinate points of the two
dimensional Euclidean space and each node is connected
to other nodes that are one unit away from it.
• Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph – also known as
the A (N, pi) model [50]. In it, two nodes share an edge
with probability pi, independently from the presence of
other edges. A random graph constructed through this
algorithm is characterized with very low clustering, long
shortest path length and Poisson degree pdf.
• Watts-Strogatz (WS) random graph – a model for
generating random graphs introduced in [51] and defined
asA (N, d, β), where d is the average degree and β ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability that an edge will be “rewired”. In
short, the construction of a WS random graph is as fol-
lows. First, a d-regular ring lattice is constructed by
putting the nodes on integer values of a circle with cir-
cumference N+1 and connecting them to their d nearest
neighbors. Then, each generated edge (i, j) (with i < j)
is rewired to (i, k), where k 6= i is a uniformly chosen
node, with probability β. We point out that d-regular
ring lattices and ER random graphs emerge as special
types of the WS graph when β = 0 and β = 1, respec-
tively. When 0 < β < 1 the existence of a local ring
lattice structure produces high clustering, whereas the
4randomly reallocated edges lead to short path lengths,
i.e. the small-world property.
• Barabasi-Albert (BA) random scale-free network – a
model based on the preferential attachment mechanism
for generating random graphs [52]. The construction of
a BA network, written as A (N,m), is represented as a
dynamical process. Concretely, in the beginning a fully
connected network of m0 nodes (Ni = N \ i for all i) is
created. Then, at each time step a new node i is born
that makes connections tom other nodes that are present
in the network. The node connects to a particular node
j with probability proportional to its current degree. Be-
sides having the same properties of high clustering and
small-world as the WS graph, the BA graph has a scale-
free degree pdf. Therefore, the BA model has been ex-
tensively applied for studying real world systems, ranging
from social to biological networks and beyond [52, 53].
D. Deterministic approximation
We approximate the stochastic model (1) by a de-
terministic model (under the same behavioral update),
where the random variables are substituted with their
respective expectations
yi(t) = b
∑
j
Aij
di
pj(t)− czipi(t). (3)
In (3), zi is defined as
zi =
∑
j
Aji/dj.
This quantity acts as a local centrality measure of a node,
with node i being more “important” if it has many neigh-
bors, and the neighbors themselves have few neighbors.
In our model of interactions, this node would be called
upon rather frequently. The measure, that we refer to
as “neighborhood importance index”, reflects the role of
network topology in the promotion and stability of co-
operation. When considering random walks on complex
networks, one can show that zi is exactly the sum of the
jump probabilities towards node i from its neighbors [54].
When written in vector form, for (3) we have
y(t) = Θ · p(t),
where Θii = −czi, and Θij = b
Aij
di
, for i 6= j.
In Fig. 1 we present the comparison between the
stochastic and the deterministic model in terms of the
mean squared error (MSE) between the realizations of
the individual cooperation probabilities and their deter-
ministic counterparts (analytical solutions of the deter-
ministic model). We observe that in the time limit the
steady state behavior of both models is almost identical.
In addition, the steady state solution depends only on
the benefit-to cost ratio b/c, and the particular values of
b and c only determine the rate of convergence, i.e the
duration of the transient regime.
III. RESULTS
Here, we address in more details the issues of coop-
eration in relation to the network topology. We thereby
highlight the role of the neighborhood importance index z
(more precisely its distribution over the network nodes).
In particular, we describe the steady state behavior of
the deterministic model and derive important properties
related to the existence and stability of cooperation.
A. Steady state behavior
The update rule (2) yields the following set of iterative
equations for i = 1, . . . , N
pi(t+ 1) = f (Yi(t− 1) +Θi · p(t)) ,
where Θi is the i−th row of Θ. In steady state it has to
be fulfilled
p∗i = f
(
f−1 (p∗i ) +Θip
∗
)
,
for i = 1, . . . , N . By applying the inverse map we get
f−1 (p∗i ) = f
−1 (p∗i ) +Θip
∗. (4)
The above requires y∗i
.
= Θip
∗ = 0, unless either p∗i = 1
(i.e. Y∗i = f
−1 (p∗i ) =∞), or p
∗
i = 0 (i.e.Y
∗
i = −∞).
It is easy to verify that if there exists i such that p∗i = 0,
then the same is true for all i ∈ N . Indeed, when p∗i = 0,
then from (3) it must hold that either: 1) y∗i > 0, or:
2) p∗j = 0 for all j in the neighborhood of i, j ∈ Ni.
The condition 1 implies p∗i = 1, which is a contradiction.
The condition 2 yields p∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N by repeating
the same argument to the nodes in the neighborhood of
i, until all nodes are reached. We note that this case
is also covered by the requirement Θip
∗ = 0, with the
solution p∗ = 0. Hence, a steady state solution fulfills
p∗ ∈ 0 ∪ (0 1]N and is thereby characterized by non-
negative steady state payoffs y∗i ≥ 0. We note that a
steady state p∗ = 0 is also reached whenever the initial
conditions are p(1) = 0. We will, however, exclude this
trivial possibility in the analysis that follows.
In steady state, the nodes may thus be attributed to
two (disjoint) sets, W = {w ∈ N : y∗w = 0} and S =
{s ∈ N : y∗s > 0}, depending on the steady state payoff
y∗i . As a consequence of (4), the nodes in S are further
characterized by p∗i = 1, while the nodes in W may take
both values p∗i = 1 and p
∗
i < 1, depending on the net-
work parameters. We will refer to the nodes in the sets
W and S as “weak”, respectively “strong” nodes, with
an intention to emphasize their role in the bifurcation
analysis performed later. Accordingly, there are two sets
of relations that have to be satisfied
0 =
b
di
∑
j
Aijp
∗
j − czip
∗
i , i ∈ W
y∗i =
b
di
∑
j
Aijp
∗
j − czi, i ∈ S. (5)
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FIG. 1. Mean squared error (MSE) comparison of the stochastic and the deterministic models. For the stochastic model, the
results are averaged across 100 network realizations. (a) Regular graph. (b) ER graph. (c) BA graph. (d) WS graph. (a-d)
b/c = 1.8. (e-h) Same as (a-d), only b/c = 1.5. (i-l) Same as (a-d), only b/c = 1.2. (a-l) A lighter shade indicates lower
parameter values. All graphs have 100 nodes and average degree 8. In each run we set the initial values Yi(0) = −4 and
pi(0) = 0.05 for all i. We assume synchronous update.
Note that in (5) the sets W ,S, the steady state values
p∗i , i ∈ W and the constants y
∗
i , i ∈ S are unknown.
B. Properties of the model
In the following we derive some important properties
of the model. In particular, we investigate the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the spread and stability of
cooperation, in relation to the network topology.
1. Robustness to exploitation: The non-negativity of the
individual steady state payoffs y∗i in (5) has an impor-
tant implication on the promotion of cooperation in net-
works as it ultimately protects the individual nodes from
exploitation by the rest of the network. This is, in gen-
eral, at contrast to other mechanisms based on general
reciprocity where the anonymity of donors and receivers
makes it difficult to single out and punish defectors, leav-
ing the nodes vulnerable to exploitation. Fig. 2 illustrates
the range of the individual steady state payoffs and the
average network payoff 〈y∗〉 as a function of the bene-
fit/cost ratio b/c, for the different network models.
2. Necessary condition for the existence of cooperation:
It is easy to show that b/c < 1 implies pi = 0 for all
i ∈ N . Indeed, if there exists i such that p∗i > 0, then
the total steady state network payoff
∑
i
y∗i = b
∑
i
∑
j
Aij
di
p∗j − c
∑
i
∑
j
Aji
dj
p∗i
= (b− c)
∑
i
zip
∗
i , (6)
is strictly negative, implying that there is some i for
which y∗i < 0 (contradiction). Hence, b/c ≥ 1 is a nec-
essary condition for the existence of cooperators (nodes
with p∗i > 0).
3. Promotion of cooperation: We observe that when
b/c > 1, the steady state probabilities are strictly greater
than 0, p∗i > 0 for all i ∈ N . Indeed, if there exists i such
6that p∗i = 0 then, as already discussed, it must hold that
p∗i = 0, for all i ∈ N . This, however, would yield a total
network payoff
∑
i y
∗
i = 0, which contradicts (6).
4. Sufficient condition for the existence of unconditional
cooperators (strong nodes): When b/c > 1, there is al-
ways at least one strong node in the network. This fol-
lows directly from the observation that when b/c > 1 the
RHS of (6) is strictly greater than zero, which implies
that there is at least one i for which y∗i > 0 and p
∗
i = 1.
Combined together, property 3. and property 4. state
that, as a consequence of the update rule 2, the network
nodes cooperate with the maximum possible probability,
such as their pay-off is non-negative. In other words,
they are not exploited by their environment.
5. Necessary condition for the existence of unconditional
cooperators (strong nodes): The condition zi > b/c im-
plies p∗i < 1, which follows by substituting
∑
j
Aij
di
p∗j ≤ 1
in (5). In other words, a necessary condition for i to be
strong (i.e. unconditional cooperator p∗i = 1) is zi ≤ b/c.
6. Necessary and sufficient condition for full network co-
operation: We show that
b/c ≥ zmax, (7)
where zmax is the largest neighborhood importance in-
dex in the graph, zmax = maxi(zi), is both necessary and
sufficient for all nodes to be strong (full network cooper-
ation).
We note that the proof that p∗i = 1, ∀i ∈ N , implies
b/c ≥ zmax, follows directly from property 3. To prove
the converse, we use contradiction. We first define pmin =
inf p∗i , i ∈ N , and set b/c to be greater than one (b/c > 1
being the prerequisite for cooperative behavior).
Now, let us assume that the converse is not true, that
is b/c ≥ zi for all i, and there exists some i such that
p∗i < 1. Under this assumption, for all i we would have:
y∗i = b
∑
j
Aij
di
p∗j − czip
∗
i ,
≥ b
∑
j
Aij
di
p∗j − c
b
c
p∗i ,
which implies
p∗i +
y∗i
b
≥
∑
j
Aij
di
p∗j .
However, for those i satisfying p∗i < 1, we know that
y∗i = 0, implying
p∗i ≥
∑
j
Aij
di
p∗j ≥ pmin. (8)
For all i satisfying b/c > zi, (8) holds with strict inequal-
ity, whereas those i′ for which b/c = zi′ must satisfy
p∗i′ = pmin. This, however, can hold if and only if the
nodes corresponding to these indices are only linked to
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FIG. 2. Average steady state payoff 〈y∗〉 as a function of b/c
(solid line), averaged over 100 graph realizations. The regions
(in lighter shade) enclose the area between the minimum and
the maximum node payoff observed in the network. (a) Reg-
ular graph. (b) ER graph. (c) BA graph. (d) WS graph.
(a)-(d) All graphs have 1000 nodes and average degree 8.
each other, i.e. form a connected component. In that
case zmax = 1 = b/c which contradicts the assumption
b/c > 1. Hence, the converse must also be true, which
concludes the proof.
C. Derivation of the steady state solution
Having addressed the general steady state behavior of
the model and derived its most important properties,
here we provide bifurcation analysis to determine the
steady state solution of (5). To do so, we keep the cost
c fixed and vary the benefit b in order to determine their
influence on the system. Fig. 3 serves as a graphical
illustration for the analysis.
We start with the remark that b/c ≥ zmax ensures
that all nodes are unconditional cooperators (i.e. strong),
p∗i = 1, for all i ∈ N . This follows directly from nec-
essary and sufficient condition for full network coopera-
tion (property 6.). We denote b1 = czmax and introduce
W1 as the set of nodes with indices w1 ∈ W1 satisfying
zw1 = b1/c (note that W1 may have more than one el-
ement). For i ∈ W1 the payoff becomes y∗i = 0, while
it is still p∗i = 1. By reducing b beyond b1, for i ∈ W1
the probability of cooperation becomes p∗i < 1 (i.e the
nodes become weak), as p∗i = 1 would imply a payoff
y∗i < 0 (contradiction). The value(s) p
∗
i are determined
from (5), by plugging in p∗i < 1 for i ∈ W1. Thus, b1 is
the first bifurcation point and the nodes in the setW1 are
the first to become weak, i.e. to break up with uncondi-
tional cooperation. The remaining nodes S(1) = N \W1
are still strong.
We proceed by using induction to determine the set
of weak nodes W(n+1) =
⋃n
i=1Wi and the (remaining)
strong nodes S(n+1) = N\W(n+1) for any b in the interval
7FIG. 3. (a) A visualization of a small random graph with
10 nodes. The nodes are colored according to the order of
switching from strong to weak when decreasing the b/c ratio
– a darker color indicates higher switching propensity. The
node size is proportional to the index zi. (b) Fraction of
strong nodes σ as a function of the (decreasing) b/c ratio.
between two bifurcation points, bn > b ≥ bn+1. After
substituting p∗i = 1 for the nodes in S
(n+1), we determine
p∗i for the nodes inW
(n+1) from the remaining equations.
By applying some simple algebra to reorganize the
equations for the nodes in the set W(n), for all b in the
interval between bn and the next bifurcation point bn+1,
bn > b ≥ bn+1, we obtain
∑
j∈S(n)
b
czidi
Aij = p
∗
i −
∑
j∈W(n)
b
czidi
Aijp
∗
j , i ∈ W
(n).
The last equation can be written in matrix form
a = (I−AW(n))p
∗, (9)
where the vector a is the vector of sums appearing on the
left-hand side of (9), while AW(n) is a weighted version of
the neighborhood matrix of the subgraph associated with
W(n). The solution is unique provided that the matrix
I−AW(n) is nonsingular, i.e. the inverse (I−AW(n))
−1
exists. In that case the solution reads
p∗ = (I−AW(n))
−1
a.
We note that in reality, and particularly in large net-
works, the nonsingularity condition for I−AW(n) is ful-
filled almost certainly.
D. Alternate projection method for the steady
state solution
The bifurcation analysis provides an analytical solu-
tion to the steady state cooperation probabilities for each
b/c > 1. By the definition of steady state, the same so-
lution would be obtained by starting from an arbitrary
initial condition p(0) ∈ (0 1]N and letting the network
evolve according to our payoff and update rules. Note
that the steady state conditions may be reformulated as
y∗i = b
∑
j
Aij
di
p∗j − czip
∗
i
0 = y∗i (1− p
∗
i ) ,
resulting in a nonlinear (quadratic) system of 2N equa-
tions with 2N variables in total. Hence, a simplified, iter-
ative approach based on the alternate projection method
can be used for finding the steady state solution. This
method may be summarized as follows:
1. Set y∗i = 0 for all i satisfying the condition zi ≥ b/c.
Set p∗i = 1 for the remaining nodes. Solve the N -
dimensional linear system to find the remaining p∗i
and y∗i (N unknowns in total)
2. For all i satisfying y∗i < 0 in the obtained solu-
tion, set y∗i = 0 and let their corresponding p
∗
i to
be unknown. Solve again the corresponding linear
system of N equations with N unknowns in total.
3. Repeat steps 1. and 2. until there are no y∗i < 0.
E. Implications of the model
While the connection is not imminent, the addressed
model may still be framed in the context of evolutionary
game theory, by associating the accumulated payoff with
fitness of the individual nodes. In this sense, our main
contribution can be related to the results for the known
rules for evolution of cooperation (see Table I). In par-
ticular, it can be seen as a rule for cooperation based on
generalized reciprocity on graphs. One has to be care-
ful, however, when comparing the different rules, as they
usually arise from different setups and are dependent on
the interaction model/game update. For example, the
model in [40] assumes pairwise node interactions where
each node pair is chosen on random during each iteration,
yielding a uniform distribution on the number of interac-
tion instances per node. In our model, on the other hand,
some nodes (i.e. those with a large z-index) engage more
regularly in the interactions with their neighbors, thus re-
flecting the role of network structure. With this in mind,
and after accounting for the differences in the interaction
model, a natural connection may be made between the
presented mechanism based on generalized reciprocity on
graphs, and the mechanisms based on indirect reciprocity
[55], network reciprocity (revisited) [56], and generalized
reciprocity [40], as highlighted in Table I.
We turn the attention to Fig. 4a which sheds light on
the effect of network structure on the promotion of coop-
eration under the addressed model. As an indicator for
the level of network cooperation we consider the steady
state fraction of unconditional cooperators σ as a func-
tion of the benefit/cost ratio b/c (b > c is the prerequisite
for cooperation). The figure reveals that the Barabasi-
Albert (BA) scale-free graph requires the largest b/c for
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FIG. 4. (a) Fraction of unconditional cooperators σ as a function of b/c for Regular, ER, BA, and WS graphs. Dashed lines
indicate the threshold for full network cooperation according to equation (7). (b) Probability density function (pdf) of the
index z for the same random graphs. We note that for the Regular graph the pdf is concentrated on a single point (i.e the
index z is the same across all nodes, z = 1). (a-b) The results are obtained by averaging over 100 different graph realizations.
All graphs have 1000 nodes and average degree 8.
full network cooperation to take place (all nodes uncon-
ditional cooperators), followed by the Erdos-Renyi (ER)
graph and the Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world graph.
In contrast, for a small b/c ratio, the BA graph has the
largest fraction of cooperators among these three graph
types. The Regular graph presents itself as the most
supportive to cooperation, as b > c implies full, uncondi-
tional cooperation on network level.
The reason for this behavior may be directly inferred
from Fig. 4b, where we depict the probability density
function (pdf) of the index z across the network nodes
for the same random graphs. We recall that that the indi-
vidual cooperative behavior in the network is determined
by this index. The nodes with a higher value of it are
in “less favorable” position in the network, as they will
be called upon more often in our interactions model. For
higher values of the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c, the global
cooperative behavior is dominated by the tail (the right-
hand side) of the distribution, i.e. the fraction of network
nodes with high values of the z-index. This explains ex-
actly the lower fraction of unconditional cooperators in
the BA graph in this regime, as compared to the other
random graph configurations. On the other hand, the
behavior in the low b/c regime is determined by the left-
hand side of the distribution, where again a large mass
is distributed in the case of the BA graph. As a result,
in this regime we find higher fraction of unconditional
cooperators in the BA graph compared to the ER and
the WS graph, as shown in the box of Fig. 4a.
F. Stability of cooperation
So far, we addressed the case when all nodes were sub-
ject to the same behavioral mechanism (2) to update
their individual probabilities of cooperation. In the fol-
lowing, we assume that a fraction δ = D/N of the nodes
become unconditional defectors (pi(t) = 0), independent
on their accumulated payoff. The aim is to assess the
robustness of the (in general cooperative) behavioral up-
date to the presence of defectors.
The bifurcation analysis as well as the alternate pro-
jection method can be easily accommodated to account
for this characteristic. Additionally, several properties
derived for the original case can be generalized to this
setup. Particularly, in the presence of unconditional de-
fectors, the necessary condition for existence of uncon-
ditional cooperators (property 5.), becomes di
qi
zi ≤ b/c,
where qi is the number of neighbors of i that are not
unconditional defectors. In addition, the necessary and
sufficient condition for full network cooperation (property
6.) now reads b/c ≥ maxi
di
qi
zi. The remaining proper-
ties can not be easily generalized as they depend on the
initial selection of defecting nodes.
Numerical results are summarized in Fig. 5 where we
plot a heat map for the fraction of “defective instances”
as a function of δ and b/c. By defective instance we un-
derstand the absence of a strong node in the network
in steady state. Interestingly, the BA graph presents it-
self as the most robust to an invasion of defectors, as
it registers the smallest number of defective instances δ
for the same ratio b/c. The ER graph provides to be
slightly less robust than the BA graph. As least robust
to an invasion of defectors come the WS and the Regular
graph, which present similar behavior in this setup. The
reason for this behavior becomes apparent if we, again,
look at the distribution of the index z in different random
graphs. Since in this case we are interested in the num-
ber of defective instances (i.e. graph realizations without
unconditional cooperators in the network), decisive is the
shape of the left-hand-side of the pdf of z. As the exis-
tence of unconditional defectors in the neighborhood of
a node i decreases the payoff of node i, its influence on
the cooperative behavior of node i may be understood as
9TABLE I. Cooperation Mechanisms
Mechanism Rule Note
Kin selection b/c > 1/g g denotes the probability that two agents share a gene [2].
Group selection b/c > 1 + n/m n and m, are respectively, the maximum group size
and number of groups [4].
Direct reciprocity b/c > 1/w w is the probability that a game will last one more round [7].
Network reciprocity b/c > 〈d〉 〈d〉 is the average number of neighbors [19].
Network reciprocity b/c > 〈d2〉 〈d2〉 is the average degree of the nearest neighbors [56].
(revisited)
Indirect reciprocity b/c > 1/q q is the probability to know someones reputation [55].
Generalized reciprocity b/c > (v + n2)/(v − n2) v denotes the number of interactions, and n is the group size [40].
Generalized reciprocity b/c ≥ zmax zmax is the maximum neighborhood importance index.
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FIG. 5. Heat map for the fraction of defective instances as
a function of δ = D/N and b/c. D out of N nodes are ran-
domly chosen to be unconditional defectors and the results
are averaged over 100 realizations. (a) Regular graph. (b)
ER graph. (c) BA graph. (d) WS graph. (a)-(d) All graphs
have 100 nodes and average degree 8. Results are averaged
across 100 graph realizations.
an “effective” increase of the value of the index zi. This,
on the other hand may drive unconditional cooperators
to extinction (a defective distance is declared for the par-
ticular configuration). As depicted in Fig. 4b, due to the
higher fraction of nodes with small values of the index z,
the BA graph is on average less affected by this condition,
i.e. it is more robust to an invasion of defectors.
G. Accounting for restricted memory
The state-based behavioral rule (2) implicitly assumes
that each past event is valued equally. However, some-
times the agents (nodes) have short memory, and thus
may give higher importance to recent interactions. We
can account for this effect by adding a weight r, 0 ≤ r ≤
1, to the accumulated payoff, i.e.
Yi(t) = rYi(t− 1) +Θip(t).
We note that the case r = 1 corresponds to the update
(2). When r < 1, the steady state probability for coop-
eration for node i is
p∗i = f
(
Θip
∗
1− r
)
= f
(
y∗i
1− r
)
. (10)
In this case, the accumulated payoff converges to a finite
value since the steady state payoffs represent converging
geometric series, implying 0 < p∗i < 1. We point out
that, with the introduction of the weight r, exploitation
can not be prevented by employing the update rule (2) for
small enough b/c ratios, as in some cases it may happen
that y∗i < 0 for some i. This can be seen by applying the
inverse map to (10), as we get
y∗i = (1− r) f
−1 (p∗i ) ,
which can be negative if f−1 (p∗i ) is negative. This hap-
pens, for example, if f (·) is the standard logistic function,
with steepness k = 1 and midpoint ω0 = 0, and p
∗
i < 1/2.
However, there is a threshold β∗ for which if b/c ≥ β∗
exploitation is prevented. As can be seen from equation
(10) the threshold depends on the underlying network
type and the parameter r, and can not be easily derived.
Nevertheless, we can provide its lower and upper bounds,
βLB and βUB that are independent from r. In particular,
we can safely assume that βLB = 1 because, as previ-
ously said, b/c > 1 is a prerequisite for cooperation. To
derive the upper bound βUB, we again assume the ex-
istence of the minimal probability for cooperation pmin
(its presence is a valid assumption since, from (10), we
know that pi > 0 for all i). Then, from (5), it follows
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that yi ≥ bpmin − czipi. Therefore, in order for yi to be
nonnegative for all i it must be that
bpmin ≥ czipi ≥ czipmin
for all i, or b/c ≥ zmax. Interestingly, this is the same
value as the condition for full network cooperation in the
infinite memory case. When the network is regular, the
bounds coincide, thus leading to β∗ = 1, a result which
is independent of r.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, when r = 0, f(·)
is very steep (such that pi(t + 1) = 1 if yi(t) > 0, and
pi(t + 1) = 0, otherwise) and setting N = 2, we get the
tit-for-tat strategy in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma.
IV. DISCUSSION
We argue that the (stochastic) equations (1) and (2)
provide a realistic model for the dynamics of network
interactions in a large plethora of real-life networks. Un-
der this model, network cooperation comes as a result
of the inherent feature of the behavioral mechanism that
prevents participating nodes from being exploited by the
environment. In particular, the simple update rule (2)
requires minimal cognitive abilities and very little infor-
mation retention and retrieval as the decisions of individ-
uals to cooperate or not, only depend on their internal
state which captures the past experience of their inter-
actions with the network. The internal state may mirror
fitness in biological systems, wealth or well-being in ani-
mal and human societies, or battery level (energy) in ar-
tificial systems (e.g. wireless ad-hock networks). Due to
its simplicity, this behavioral mechanism is more likely to
evolve in real networks than, e.g. direct or indirect types
of reciprocity, which require much more specific memory,
cognitive ability and effort.
A corollary of our findings is that, under the addressed
model for network interactions (1), and the behavioral
mechanism (2), the BA scale-free graph is the most in-
hibitive to cooperation, followed by the ER graph and the
WS small-world graph, while the regular graph presents
itself as the most supportive for cooperation (as displayed
in Fig. 4 and Fig. 2). The picture is inverted in the pres-
ence of pure defectors in the network, as then, the BA
graph provides the highest degree of robustness, followed
by the ER graph (as captured by Fig. 5).
We point out that, while most of our conclusions are
along the same lines in [10, 56, 57], they do not contra-
dict the findings in [58, 59] which suggest that, under
the model addressed there, scale-free networks enhance
cooperation. We argue that the apparent inconsistencies
found in the literature, may be attributed to the differ-
ences in the way that network interactions are modeled.
Therefore, it is important that all findings in this context
are, in general, interpreted in light of the specifics of the
addressed model only.
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